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Introduction
Violence, crime, and insecurity are major topics in contemporary political and societal discourses in Central America. With very different crime rates and varying thematic foci, these topics are discussed in the media, politics, and society. It is noticeable that the fear of crime and the public sensationalization of crime and violence vary significantly from country to country. Thus, low crime rates do not necessarily reduce fear and vice versa.
This paper is related to a research project about discourses on violence and crime in contemporary Central America, 1 and is based on the observation that the "talk of crime" is very prevalent in Costa Rica, a country usually known as being calm and peaceful. The extensive fear of crime becomes manifest in many different social spaces and contexts. Rico recently stated, on the basis of crime statistics and opinion polls, that a) many Costa Ricans do not have a clear idea, or even have a very incorrect idea, of crime rates in Costa Rica and that b) the number of Costa Ricans who have the impression that they could very likely become a victim of crime is remarkably high (Rico 2006: 30) . In 2004, for example, 77.6 percent of the 1 For further publications by the project see: www.giga-hamburg.de/projects/violence-and-discourse/. (Rico 2006: 31-32) . wire, and the number of private security guards per 100,000 inhabitants is the highest in Central America (UNODC 2007: 82) . The question is why violence and crime play such an important role, especially in Costa Rica, a country with comparatively low crime rates.
This paper points out the importance of the historical discourse about national identity as a key factor for research about the fear of crime in Costa Rica. The proclamation of a "problem" by the media or politicians does not necessarily or inevitably lead to acceptance among the people. The thesis of this paper is that the public discourse about violence and crime leads to confusion and panic in Costa Rica because it is in conflict with the collective identity of the imagined Costa Rican community (Anderson 1983) . The specially imagined Costa Rican nation provides a common thread between violence and crime on one side, and confusion and fear on the other side. I point out the strong connection between discourses about crime and violence and those about national identity as linked social constructions of reality.
I do so on the basis of very different sources or groups of narrators.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section I first present the theoretical framework. In section 3 I briefly present Costa Rican crime statistics as the basis for further arguments. I show that Costa Rican crime rates do not naturally provide reasons for the extensive fear of crime. In section 4 I present the basic observations that led to our thesis. I analyze the cultural stereotypes of collective peacefulness vs. violence from different sources in order to prove that a specific imagination of the Costa Rican nation runs like a thread through many different discursive arenas. In section 5 I discuss the constructed national identity and the power of the public discourse on crime and violence. I then close by highlighting issues for further research in section 6.
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Crime, Violence, and Identity as Enmeshed Constructions
Theoretically, this paper refers to the sociology of knowledge as well as to the debate on national identity and tradition. With regard to the latter, the academic debate has been strongly influenced by the works of Anderson (1998) , Hobsbawm (1996 Hobsbawm ( , 1992 , Laclau/Mouffe (2000) , and Hall (1994 Hall ( , 1996 . The basic theoretical idea is by now well known:
national identities are not "real" or "natural" but rather culturally shaped, historically developed, and continually undergoing transformation.
Society does not have a "nature" that differs from its own imagination, its "invention", and has no "identity" that could be ascribed to a "national core", to "interests", or to an ethnic "substance." (Sarasin 2001: 68) National identity is thus formed by the national narrative. This concept can be attributed to
Halbwachs' idea of collective memory (Halbwachs 1967) . According to this approach, every individual remembers not only the background of his own experiences but also those of others. So does society. Furthermore, memory is also always a process of selection. Not every individual memory is incorporated in the collective memory, and not every single collective memory necessarily becomes part of the overall collective, or in this case national, identity.
Collective oblivion is as important as collective memory (Anderson 1998: 173-175 339), certain elements of these narratives coincide over very long periods and thereby become undisputed "truths" among the "imagined community." Therefore, it is not the existence of certain customs or habits that shapes society, but their attribution as being essentially Costa Rican (Ricoeur cited in Wodak/de Cilla 2007: 343) . In other words, society does not have a nature, but consists of a relative and precarious snapshot, which indicates a certain social order. Therefore, society can be seen as a symbolic order, using the terms of Laclau and Mouffe (2000) . The historical narratives of a "nation" regarding itself are discursively constructed and reconstructed over and over again. As Anderson has emphasized, chronology is thereby turned around, and history receives a genealogy that extends from the present to the past (Sarasin 2003: 160) . And "at the moment when a group looks back on its past it probably feels that it has remained constant and becomes aware of the identity that it always preserved" (Halbwachs 1967: 74) . 2 While scientifically deconstructed or exposed as a social construction a long time ago, the concept of natural national identities remains powerful in society.
This paper is also based on the proposition of communicative constructed social reality and values (Berger/Luckmann 1969; Bergmann/Luckmann 1999 (Jäger 2004: 148) . Certainly, powerful actors have a greater capacity to shape hegemonic discourse (see also Wodak 2001: 3) . A famous example is the mass media, which hold and wield the symbolic power to construct and diffuse opinion, in the terms of Bourdieu (1992) . Even so, there has to be an acceptance of and a transmission of these positions into everyday life for them to become "valid knowledge." If this translation into "valid knowledge" occurs, a collective imagination might become an "integral part of social organization" (Garland 2003: 106) . In other words, hegemonic discourses emerge from circles without a beginning or an end. In the case of the discourse about insecurity in Costa Rica, the media write about violence and crime, for example, because they believe what they write and, simultaneously, because the people want to read about it. The people, in turn, hear about violence and crime from the media and politicians, and claim at the same time that the media has to write about it and that politicians have to respond. Politicians know about insecurity because "everybody knows," because the people call for them to know about it, and so on. Wherever we start, it is certainly never the beginning of a discourse.
To sum up: when I talk about national identity, violence, and crime in this paper, I am basically talking about social constructions shaped by communication and attitudes (social discourses). Violence plays an important role in the continual reconstruction of national identity and social order, and national identity reciprocally affects the perception of violence as well. Mechanisms to contain violence in society, government's monopoly on the use of force, and the question of "civilization" (often in contrast to the less civilized "others") are cornerstones of national identity and social order. Therefore, it is not violence and crime which are indicators of the state of society, but rather the way in which society perceives and deals with violence and crime. The social discourse about violence, crime, and insecurity therefore has to be investigated in relation to social order and national identity.
Thus, a final theoretical basis of this paper's discussion is that the individual elements of national identity or consciousness constantly run up against a continually changing lifeworld.
National identity does not change from one day to another as a whole. The bigger part of a nation's self-invention stays the same over a very long period. However, some (more or less important) elements may become contradictory to everyday life and experience at a particular time. A "nation of peasants" encounters its limits in times of industrialization, for example. Therefore, research on changing national identity and consciousness is only possible Against this background, homicide rates are the most accepted indicator of crime. Such a felony is usually less often ignored, misjudged, overlooked, or unreported. inhabitants. But, with 7.7 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the situation in Costa Rica is still much better than in all other Central American countries (UNODC 2007), in many US cities (Godoy 2008:191) , and in comparison to the Latin American average (WHO 2002: 274) .
So what is an alarming homicide rate? This is not to say that 7.7 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 2006 is not much. But why would this number be the final straw? Before I respond to this question, I would also like to introduce the numbers for thievery. In a statistical sense, the validity of these numbers is more problematic than those for the homicide rates, but they may show rough tendencies. Thievery is one of the crimes that is mentioned most often when people talk about rising crime in Costa Rica. 4 Table 2 does not indicate an increase in thievery in Costa Rica (although I would not call these numbers objective evidence, and could even have chosen another statistic that would indicate the opposite). On the contrary, thievery rates seem to have Based on the observation that crime rates have not increased radically but rather to a manageable degree, and on the assumption that crime and violence do not have a negative impact on society per se but only if the corresponding discourses lead to a negative perception, it must be asked what else has changed in Costa Rican society. In the following section I will elaborate on some theses about the reasons for this extended fear and panic, some of which might have to do with specific elements of Costa Rican national identity (or the national narrative) and fundamental breaks in the country's history. The nationality of the Costa Ricans is a heritage of great value, which we have to save and strengthen. It includes aspects of everyday life, which aren't always easy to identify. It includes our love of freedom, the willing realization of democratic policies and manners, our love of peace, a sensation of brotherliness, and many other things that unite us and distinguish us from all other nations. (Arias 1987: 30f.) A statement by then vice minister of public security, María Fullmen Salazar, from January 2004 serves as a final example of references to nonviolent national identity by Costa Rican politicians:
It is urgent to provide a reliable, profound, and realistic analysis of this serious problem [high crime rates], which threatens the family life and democracy of a country that historically has been civilized, pacifist, and an example for other countries.
(La Nación, January 30 , 2004) The examples highlight the importance of references to nonviolence in discussions of Costa Rican national identity. Also remarkable is the special manner of testifying to national innocence and peacefulness. Firstly, none of the cited politicians or sources explicitly explains these assumed traits. The cited sources refer to these reputed characteristics as self-evident and undisputable. Secondly, the way these characteristics are declared makes them appear to be natural or even genetic in a way. Expressions like "we Costa Ricans" or "the nationality of the Costa Ricans" include every member of the nation, irrespective of social, economic or local differences among persons and groups. The statements of these very powerful and model persons already suggest that nonviolence is an important element of Costa Rican national consciousness that was socially constructed long ago and persists in the present. A look at other discursive arenas confirms this observation.
Newspapers
The mass media are important actors and forums in the social construction of "truth" or "valid knowledge." They diffuse opinions (as elements of hegemonic discourses) on the one hand, and produce and transform them on the other hand (Bourdieu 1998: 28) . Hence, they are a widely noticed forum for powerful actors as well as powerful speakers themselves. Cocco (2003: 57) refers to this dual capacity, when she says, more than being a reproduction of reality, a newspaper article is a creation. Journalists imitate, but also create-create new reality, reorganize the world, and the present, recycle sense. Informing is not only communicating, but creating and talking someone into believing something.
In order to trace the link between the discourses about violence and national identity, we will take a look at Costa Rica's leading newspaper, La Nación. The newspaper articles cited above demonstrate that the discourse about Costa Rica as a nonviolent nation is spread in the media too. La Nación is simultaneously an arena for politicians to preach the peacefulness of the Costa Rican nation and a speaker itself-one which takes the same line as the politicians when publishing about violence, crime, and insecurity in Costa Rica.
Thus, I have shown that there is a strong connection in the Costa Rican political and media elite between the discourse on violence and the one about the nation's nature. But does Costa
Rican society also manifest the connection between the discourses about violence and national identity? If so, it would be revealing of the power of this specific discursive entanglement.
Angry Citizens
In this section I will analyze "everyday knowledge" about the nation's nature, as presented on an Internet forum about violence in Costa Rica. As a more or less anonymous arena, an
Internet forum is a suitable place for direct arguments. The authors write their statements voluntarily and nobody forces them in a special direction (or their statements are not limited by their social position).
In recent years, a dubious citizens' initiative named Recuperamos la Paz (Recover Peace) has been making the headlines over and over again. One of the initiative's leaders is Juan Diego
Castro, former secretary of public safety (1994) (1995) (1996) , who has been campaigning for more drastic laws or judgments in Costa Rica for years (see for example: La Prensa Líbre, March 3, 2007) . Recuperamos la Paz reaches a broad audience through public statements, (promotional)
videos, and advertisements. The initiative's slogan is "We live under the law of the villain"
("Vivimos bajo la ley del hampa") and its imagery is quite violent itself (see Figure 1 ). The initiative is trying to force the government to strengthen its "iron fist" and to deepen fear of crime with its "if you are not afraid yet, you should start to be" rhetoric. Even the current government cannot ignore Recuperamos la Paz (see for example: La Nación, April 10, 2008). The danger of increased hatred and xenophobia due to the initiative's rhetoric has already been revealed elsewhere (Federico Campos in La Nación, April 3, 2008) . Nevertheless, a closer look at the initiative's name is already enlightening in the context of this paper. "Recover Peace" is an interesting prediction in two different respects. First, it implies that there was peace before and that there is no peace today, which means it has to be recovered. In the 5
The first advertisement says, "Law XVI, Article 2: Hand over everything without resistance. We live under the law of the villain." The second advertisement says, "Law VII, Article 14: Do not use your cell phone in the streets. We live under the law of the villain."
context of the Costa Rican crime rates, the question would be when the war started. Secondly, the word "peace" refers (deliberately) to a powerful national rhetoric, as we have already seen. The initiative could serve as a perfect example of a powerful player in the social construction of fear, hatred, and panic. Nevertheless, I will not examine the initiative's objects and actions further, but will instead focus on the statements posted on its Internet discussion forum. 6 Do the authors of posts to the forum also refer to the nonviolent Costa Rican national identity when writing about crime and violence? Most articles are about the roots of crime and violence, punishment (mostly in terms of higher penalties), 7 the supposed culprits, and enforcement by the police or through the reinstallation of the armed forces. The national self-perception plays an important role in many articles. So "jlundst" writes:
It is very important to recognize the drastic changes in our society from the 80s until today. We have many social problems: ethnic ones, those concerning work, and others.
All this degrades the Costa Rican society we know. By now, we are no longer the country of peace. There has been a discussion under way about higher penalties in Costa Rica for many years now. The advocates of law and order prevail in this discussion. In 1994 the maximum prison penalty was extended to 50 years (from 25).
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The discussion on the Recuperemos la Paz forum reveals that the imagined collective identity of the peaceful Costa Ricans is an argument used not only by politicians, but also by citizens.
Among many sources, the forum statements are a good resource for proving that. Hidden behind pseudonyms and unwatched while writing their texts, the authors feel safe saying what they really think.
The cited statements reveal two different things. First, they show that the assumed sameness, and the pacifist character, of the Costa Rican national identity is internalized in the society to the same degree as in political and media discourses. Arguments made by politicians or the media do not necessarily lead to acceptance in society. If they do, it is a sign of a very powerful or even hegemonic discourse. Therefore, it is important to consider everyday discourse as the subjectivation of elite discourses.
Secondly, the statements prove an essential finding of the theory of identity and national identity: the need for "the others" in order to define "the self," or the need of distinctiveness in order to articulate uniqueness (Hall 1994; Hall 1996 ; Cilla/Reisigl/Wodak 1999). In the statements, it becomes clear that the immigrants, and especially the Nicaraguans, serve as a projection screen for incidents and habits that do not fit with the Costa Rican self-perception.
Foreign Travelers of the Nineteenth Century
As a final source, I will present travelogues from the nineteenth century, as both historical and foreign perceptions. These sources prove that the Costa Rican nonviolent collective identity has referent points in history, and that foreigners also certified (or constructed) this imagined identity. Rica, where a more equitable land distribution system was one of many differences to the other Central American countries (see for example Lindo Fuentes 1993 , Gudmundsun 1993 and Samper 1993 . While Costa Rican politics, society, and the social contract have fundamentally changed again and again in the last 150 years, the imagination of the peaceful nation has persisted and has often been reinvented.
To sum up, it can be noted that there is a strong connection between discourses about crime and violence and those about national identity in all discourse arenas analyzed. Politicians use the stereotype of the peaceful Costa Rican nature, as do journalists and the Costa Rican population. Those making such arguments can resort to historical sources, such as the travelogues. So, on the one hand, the perception of a national identity is widespread and often propagated; on the other hand, violence, crime, and insecurity in Costa Rica do not fit with this self-imagination. The long history of this perception and its continual repetition in the present present a heritage that surely puts pressure on a society where this self-perception conflicts with current experiences and public discourses-that is, those about rising crime rates and increasing public insecurity.
On the Genesis and Transformation of a Peace-loving Nation
In the following discussion, I will describe the historical context of the Costa Rican national identity and its transformation in the twentieth century. I will show that there are different historical moments in Costa Rican history that might have enforced a reconsideration of national identity against the background of "reality." Although the subject of today's discourse about violence and crime is "common" violence and delinquency-while it was rather about political violence in other periods of Costa Rican history (or is so in the historical review)-I do not distinguish between different forms of violence in this paper. When studying violence not as a social fact but rather in terms of the relationship of the Costa Rican society to violence and crime, the differentiation does not exist (or disperses beyond recognition) in the discourse itself. The abolition of the armed forces and any contemporary opposition to crime and violence are discussed as equivalent expressions of Costa Rican national identity in the described discourse arenas.
Identity after the Foundation of the Nation Sate
It is no big surprise that nineteenth century travelers perceived Costa Rica as a quiet and peaceful place. The former colony had just declared itself independent from Spain (1821), had constituted itself as an independent state (1838), and had proclaimed itself a republic (1848). Land was distributed much more equitably than in the neighboring Central American countries, a relatively wide middle class inspired by the French revolution had emerged, and the political system was stable and more or less democratic most of the time. The genesis of the specific Costa Rican national identity was related to the foundation of a liberal state which made remarkable social achievements (Molina/Palmer 1992; Acuña 1993; Acuña 1995; Molina 1993; Gólcher 1993; Malavassi Aguilar 2005) . Foreign travelers with concepts of natural national identities and human races in the back of their minds could perhaps not help but see an egalitarian, ethnically homogeneous, and integrative society of small coffee farmers. Even then that picture was not true. Needless to say, the travelers as well as many Costa Ricans confused social order with national identity. They also picked out some criteria and ignored others in order to form their opinions, and they did so in the light of their own experience and knowledge (Todorov 1982) . tation, you will see that your people, brave and male, will change their tools for weapons."
All these examples do not really fit with the image of the later state, without an army and with a naturally peaceful population. Peacefulness was already part of the spare parts warehouse of national narratives in the early twentieth century, but it wasn't yet an essential part of national identity.
The Epoch of the 1940s
In 1948, Costa Rica experienced its most violent moment of the twentieth century (Lehoucq 1993; Lehoucq 1998: 97ff) . According to Sarasin, the discourse about the nation's nature collapsed because of the reality in this crisis, the civil war, and therefore transformed itself. The nation had to reinvent itself after 1948 in order for this break to become not a trauma but a recommencement.
Identity and Peacefulness after the Lost Decade of the 1980s
After its victory in the war, Figueres' junta proclaimed the Second Republic of Costa Rica. In the following years, the educational system was reformed, social security systems including health insurance and a pension system were established, and other steps to improve infrastructure and living standards were taken. Therefore, institutions such as the banking houses were nationalized and many public institutions were founded, for instance, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), which would later provide electricity and telecommunication for nearly the entire society (Hoffmann 2007: 11) . During this period, the idea of the peaceful nation expanded (or experienced a revival) and became established as a cornerstone of national identity.
In the 1980s, Central America tumbled into two crises, an economic and a political one. Following the world economic crisis of 1979, prices increased worldwide. People had to abstain from things that weren't essential. Therefore, the Central American "dessert economies" lost their markets due to the drop in demand for their main export products: coffee, sugar, and fruit. The living standards of many Costa Ricans changed for the worse, and unemployment, public debt, and poverty increased (de Alonso 1994; Rovira Mas 1989; Bulmer-Thomas 1987: 237ff) .
Costa Rica was able to water the social crisis down through both the provision of social programs and reinforced industrialization. Nevertheless, agriculture and country life began to change and, accordingly, elements of the national identity again began to conflict with social reality.
The image of a white, rural, yeoman farmer, peaceful, and egalitarian Costa Rica-to name the essential components of that identity-has been eroded by rampant urbanization accompanied by greater violence (especially domestic violence), and, above all, by the consolidation of a class culture. (Palmer/Molina 2004: 320) While corresponding less and less with social reality, peacefulness became a more and more powerful national symbol in the context of the second Central American crisis-the political one. This crisis was marked by the violent conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The contra war in Nicaragua led to increased Nicaraguan migration to Costa Rica. Contra troops also operated in the Costa Rican north. Therefore, the government had to react to the conflict, and society started to react to the appearance of "others." Immigration became the focus of public discourses about "being swamped by foreigners"; the overloading of the social system; and possible dangers emanating from the immigrants, especially rising violence and crime (Huhn 2005) . To articulate differentiation, the Costa Rican's own identity had to be defined or verbalized again. Costa Ricans were able to resort to many tropes about themselves and about the Nicaraguans. The old story of their supposed peacefulness and the coexistent savagery of the Nicaraguans was an important one, also fed by political proc- Both conflicts have destroyed national unity (or revealed that there never was unity) and provoked revived identity crises. Costa Rica has been divided into two embittered parties in each case. The corrupt ones and the righteous ones and the self-proclaimed advocates of social justice and the self-proclaimed advocates of economic progress, respectively. All parties consider themselves to be the legitimate keepers of the holy grail of Costa Rican national identity, while the gap between self-perception and social reality gets bigger and bigger.
Conclusions
Violence and crime in Costa Rica as physical acts are no invention or imagination. I do not want to create the impression that there is no "real" crime in Costa Rica (although an act is not a crime per se, but only when it is labeled and socially accepted as such). However, there are problems in the public exposure of violence and crime which result less from the phenomena themselves than from the public discourses about them. As Laclau and Mouffe point out, even if an earthquake happens or a roof tile falls down, factually, really, and beyond anyone's will, the question remains as to whether its objective specificity is socially constructed as a natural disaster or God's will (Laclau/Mouffe 2000: 144) .
The public perception of insecurity and calls for law and order have increased significantly in Costa Rica in recent years (see also Córdoba 2006: 13) , and fear of crime is out of all proportion to crime rates. According to Garland, this trend also exists elsewhere:
Public opinion polls since the 1970s [from Great Britain and the United States] show that the majority of people believe that the crime problem is bad and getting worse and that crime rates will continue to rise in the future: a belief that persists even in periods where both recorded and actual rates are stable or declining. (Garland 2003: 107) The media, politicians, and also neighbors fuel this fear through the continual repetition of the affirmation that crime and violence are a widespread problem and a threat to everybody.
This constant repetition creates a problem perceived as "real." In an investigation about the social perception of public insecurity in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua, we found clear signs that the validity of insecurity in Costa Rica is socially constructed. In interviews, most of the people argued that they know about the omnipresent threat because they read or see it in the news everyday, because the government confirms it, and because people talk about it all the time. The authentication, in turn, leads to prevalent calls for law and order, higher penalties, and tightening of the law (Huhn 2008) . We have highlighted different aspects of this powerful discourse (see also Peetz 2008; Oettler 2007) . The mediative element between crime and fear is the public discourse:
Sensationalist treatment of violence and delinquent events can generate a climate of fear and a strong feeling of vulnerability in the population, which is not always real or in correspondence with the observed level of violence.
(Arriagada /Godoy 1999: 10) Fear of crime in Costa Rica can not be seen as a logical consequence of crime rates or a "real"
threat. The crime statistics-as the most frequently named reference in public-do not necessarily support the social relevance of crime and violence and the fear of crime. Nevertheless, the sources cited prove the existence of another nexus that could be more illustrative against the background of the introduced theory. As I have shown, crime, violence, and insecurity in Costa Rica are often discussed as problems of national identity, while, conversely, the image of national identity is based on the absence of violence. This clash of identities remains abstract when seen as antithetic facts. The theories introduced at the beginning of this discussion help to resolve the apparent contradiction. As I have shown, the public discourse about violence, crime, and insecurity in Costa Rica is conducted as a discourse about morals or the nature of the nation's character-at least partly. The continual affirmation that social facts such as crime and violence are unimaginable in Costa Rica due to the peaceful national identity obfuscates social processes and changes and simultaneously affects public discourses on violence and crime. The reference to a nonfactual peaceful identity constructs a diffuse in-group that needs one or more out-groups to define itself. This process leads to mistrust, xenophobia, generational conflict, and social exclusion, rather than to a solution to the problems. Crime and violence could therefore be seen as such a big social problem simply because they shouldn't exist in Costa Rica. In the Costa Rican selfperception, violence and crime are unthinkable, or they are perceived as exterior to the iden-tity of the protagonists. Violence and a nonviolent identity are entangled constructed realities in Costa Rica.
Finally, I want to underline the historical dimension of the constructed Costa Rican social reality as well as the social context of the discourses. As the Costa Rican national identity is not a natural fact, it was not created in one piece in one historical moment. Its continual reinvention has an enlightening history. To answer the questions of why Costa Rican identity is in crisis over the discourses on violence and crime, and vice versa, and why there is a specific discourse on violence and crime on the basis of identity and tradition, the historical perspective is crucial. Therefore, the historical analysis of the continual self-invention of the Costa Rican national identity reveals much about the country's past and present and allows for well-founded conclusions about the structure and meaning of current social discourses about the state of society.
Further investigations of the interaction between the Costa Rican national identity and "the talk of crime" should analyze and empirically solidify a) the genesis of the idea of national nonviolence, its transformation over the years, and especially its mediation in society and b) the formation of violence and crime as social problems. Here, the transformation of the social concepts of violence and crime has to be analyzed, too. Finally, not everything that is discussed as violence or crime today was always sensed or discussed in that way. For example, domestic violence once did not exist as a named element (and was therefore not "real"). Nor did specific forms of violence against children at schools. Caning was education, not violence.
An extensive inspection of the historical changes in the form and substance of the entanglement of the discourses themselves and their mediation in schools will be the next steps. 8
This investigation has to account particularly for social changes as possible cause variables in the transformation of discourses and perceptions. Many trails lead to a better understanding of the changing reality in Costa Rica. Blackouts on the basis of the affirmation that these processes are unexplainable in the naturally nonviolent Costa Rican nation are not part of the process; they lead only to simplistic and stereotypical interpretations.
